“…lo que viene es candela,” Vice President Elias Jaua warned recently.
“…war to the death,” Marciano wrote in the pro-regime Vea. “…blood could be spilled,” adds Marciano, aka Jose Vicente Rangel.
Rangel – a former vice president, defense minister and foreign minister – was just appointed to the newly activated Council of State, an advisory entity contemplated in the Bolivarian Constitution of 1999.
Chavez ordered the six-member Council of State to come up with a plan to withdraw Venezuela from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (CIDH), an arm of the OAS in Washington, DC.
The council’s creation is a mere bureaucratic formality, of course; it’s a given that the Bolivarian Revolution must quit the CIDH as it prepares to defy voters and the world – and perpetuate itself in power by any and all means including fraud, repression and violence.
Rangel has been a Castro asset in Venezuela since the late 1950s.
Vice-President Elias Jaua is the Council of State’s president, as established in the constitution.
Jaua, who also enjoys Havana’s support, also commands the Francisco Miranda Patriotic Front, a nominally political entity that reportedly also has the capacity to deploy upwards of 3,000 armed, trained fighters. But Jaua’s gunmen are just a fraction of the thousands of hardcore Venezuelans committed to the radical vision of the Bolivarian revolution.
Edmund Saade of Datos noted in a recent Business Venezuela article that there are two different Venezuela’s living inside the same geographical territory, and there’s no reconciling the two different countries.
Saade’s assessment is sharply at odds with the campaign message of Henrique Capriles Radonsky, who is preaching inclusion, conciliation, negotiation, tolerance, and consensus.
Capriles is pitching voters a win-win message; everyone wins, the rising tide of recovery, growth and prosperity raises all boats, a thousand points of light on a shining hill, change we can believe in rhetoric.
But Saade’s view suggests that the only options in Venezuela are win-lose, or lose-lose. Winner takes all, or everybody loses.
Chavez is still the president, nominally. But Chavez is no longer in control of fast-moving developments.
Chavez is in Cuba more or less permanently now, under the 24/7 care of the best Cuban medical doctors under the direct supervision and command of Fidel Castro.
Chavez may be ruling by Twitter and speed dial, but Fidel is calling the shots now in Bolivarian Venezuela.
Votes and peaceful resistance are the only weapons in the political opposition’s arsenal.
But the Bolivarian regime, now firmly in Fidel’s hands, will do what it has to stay in power – with or without Chavez.
In fact, the regime’s senior henchmen are more determined than ever to stay in power as a result of former narco-judge Eladio Aponte’s tales of the direct involvement of General Henry Rangel Silva and Cliver Alcala, Diosdado Cabello, Elias Jaua and other senior regime officials in drug trafficking and judicial tampering.
“Le van a dar una patada a la mesa,” my Army compadre forecasts.
They – the regime plus Fidel – are going to kick the table over and start a civil war, if that’s what it takes to stay in power.
There will not be any peaceful, democratic transfer of power. The Bolivarian regime’s thugs will not hand over the government to Capriles “under any circumstances,” the colonel says.
Fidel and Raul Castro won’t allow Capriles to assume power democratically either, he adds.
The Castro boys know that immediately that Capriles assumes the presidency in 2013 their Venezuelan sugar daddy is gone.
No more crude oil and other freebies for Havana totaling $5 billion to $7 billion annually.
The Cuban revolution is toast without its Bolivarian lifeline.
There are between 40,000 and 50,000 Cuban nationals deployed on missions in Venezuela, infiltrated into the armed forces, the Bolivarian militia units, and every key institution of governance in the country.
Anything can happen in Venezuela. No one is prepared for whatever could happen. But the Cubans under Fidel’s command fully intend to be dominant players in the end-game.
Here’s one scenario:
The Chavez regime withdraws Venezuela from the CIDH without bothering with any statutory formalities, even if that implies it gets cut off from the OAS. The presidential elections are held this year, if not on 7 October then in December, with or without Chavez, and Chavez or whoever the regime’s replacement candidate might be wins even if exit polls show Capriles with 80% of the vote. The MUD protests, the “international community” protests, there might even be street protests, but the regime stays in power. There will be an increase in street violence before the elections, particularly over the 90s days from thestart of July to the end of September, followed by a substantial spike in violence after the elections (if they’re not postpone to December). The Bolivarian armed forces won’t save the day for the good guys. After 14 years of Chavez the military is utterly destroyed as a professional institution that respects the constitution and rule of law in a civilian representative democracy. Venezuela will become more ungovernable, more unlivable, more uncivilized. Those who are not with ‘the process’ will have the option of surrendering, or else joining the Venezuelan diaspora. There isn’t room in one national territory for two irreconcilable visions of Venezuelan, as Saade noted. Venezuela is mired for years in economic stagnation and political violence.